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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
December 8, 1978 Conference
List 1, Sheet 1

~1 ~rom

No. 78-437-ADX

~;n)

CALIFANO (Sec. HEW)

D. Mass.

v.
WESTCOTT (AFDC claimant)

Federal/Civil

Timely (w/ 2 extns.)

No. 78-689-ADX
SHARP (Comm. Mass. Dept. Pub.
Welfare)

same

v.

same

WESTCOTT
'

SUMMARY: These are direct

appe~ls

Timely
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1252 from a decision of the United States District Court for

-

the District pf Massachusetts declaring § 407 of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.Co § 607, unconstitutional as violative of
the equal protection guarantee of the 5th Amendment. Section 407

""'----

-

provides AFDC benefits · to two-p9fent families in which a dependent
child has been deprived of parental support because of the unemployment of 'the father·, but does not provide benefits when the
mother becomes unemployed. Sec. Califano in No~ 78-437 challenges
. T ~ vvo-G. . p~

•

-2-

the equal protection decision on the merits, but does not
question the relief ordered by the DC. Commissioner Sharp in
No. 78-689 acquiesces in the decision on the merits, but
challenges the relief.
BACKGROUND: The Aid to Families with Dependent .C hildren
(AFDC) program, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et. seg., provides financial
assistance to families with needy dependent children. If a
state elects to participate in the program, it must comply with
the requirements of the Act and the applicable federal regulations, and its plan must be approved by the Secretary of HEW.
A state with a qualifying plan is reimbursed by the federal
government for a percentage of its expenditures. If a state
that participates in the AFDC program also participates in the
Medicaid program, individuals who receive AFDC benefits are
entitled to receive Medicaid benefits.
As originally enacted in 1935, the AFDC program provided
benefits only to families whose children were needy because of
the death, absence, or incapacity of a parent. 42 U.S.C. § 606.
This provision, which survives today, was gender-neutral: benefits
.

·-·

,_

__

.

- ·-

-- -----

are .avail,able to .a ny · f.amily. _so · long as c:me parent of either
sex was dead, absent, or incapacitated, and the family meets · the
financial requirements for eligibility. In 1961 Congress expanded
the AFDC program to provide assistance to certain families
where both parents are present and not disabled, but
the

c~~ldren

are in

n~~qpecause

of a parent's un-

j

employment.

J

1967, however, Congress made this extension permanent, and in

Again, this extension was gender-neutral. In

J

so: doing added a gender classification to the statute. The
definition of "dependent child" in § 407 now includes a "needy

.

;·
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child ••• who has been deprived of pa·rental support or care by
reason of the unemployment (as determined in accordance with
standards prescribed by the Secretary) of his father •••• "
This portion of the program is known as Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, Unemployed Father (AFDC-UF).

Al,though all

50 states participate in the AFDC program, only 26 states (and
the District of Columbia) take part in the AFDC-UF program.
One of these states is Massachusetts.
To be eligible for benefits under the AFDC-UF program, a
family must meet both categorical and financial requirements.
The major categorical requirements are that the father must
have had 6 or more quarters of work in any 13 quarter period
ending

within one year prior to the application for aid, and

must be currently employed for less than 100 hours per month.
The financial requirement is that the family's income may not
exceed the AFDC standard of need.
FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Appellees are two couples who
do not qualify for AFDC-UF benefits, eyen though both meet
the financial requirement of the Act and in both one parent
is out of work. Cindy and William Westcott are married and have
an infant son. Cindy was the family brea.d winner until ·her
most recent employment as a chambermaid ended in November 1976.
William has a minimal work history which does not give him
enough quarters of work to qualify as an unemployed father
under the Act. Cindy, however, was qualified at the time the suit
was brought. The parties have stipulated that the Westcotts satisfy
all conditions of eligibility for AFDC-UF benefits except the
condition that the unemployed parent be male.
Susan and John Westwood are married and have two small
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children. Susan was the family breadwinner from 1972 to 1977,
working 10-15 hours a week as a .bookkeeper. John is cronically
unemployed and does not have enough quarters of work to
qualify as an unemployed father. In 1977 the Westwoods applied
for Medicaid because they wanted coverage for medical care
in connection with the birth of the second child. They were
determined to be ineligible. Again, the parties have stipulated
that the Westwoods would be eligible for Medicaid but for the
requirement that the unemployed parent be male. .
The DC certified the case as a class action under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b). Addressing the equal protection claim, the court
found that there was no question but that § 407 established
a gender-based classification. Reviewing this Court's most relevant decisions, the court observed that "the standard of review
of gender based classifications has not been altogether clear."
Jur. State. 20A. Nonetheless, it concluded that Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) and Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S.
313 (1977), establish that gender-based distinctions are unconstitutional unless they "'serve important governmental objectives and [are] substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives.'" Jur. State. 21A-22A.
After examining the legislative history, the court concluded
that § 407 was designed to serve two "important governmental
objectives." First, the Act was intended to secure the protection
and care of needy children in families without a breadwinner's
support. Second, it was designed to counteract one of the perceived defects of the original AFDC program, which by making
assistance available in the event of the absence of a parent
from home

had induced the real or pretended desertion of fathers.

j

I
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The court then scrutinized the "fit" between these
governmental objectives and the gender-based classification erected by the statute. It concluded that the classification did
not further the objective of assisting families with needy
children who are without the support of a breadwinner, but would
c~use

many families

~ith

needy children to go unaided. Specifically,

families where the unemployed wage earner is female were left without
AFDC-UF benefits and Medicaid. Furthermore, the classification
would thwart the objective of preserving family stability.
In families where the unemployed wage earner is female, and benefits
are not provided, the father would have the same incentive to
desert in order to make the family elig.i ble as he had prior to
the passage of§ 407.
Finally, the court acknowledged that the notion- that fathers are
more likely to be the primary supporters of their spouses and
children "is not entirely without empirical support," quoting
Wiesenfeld v. Weinberger, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975). Nevertheless, it found that "an assumption that all mothers are not
breadwinners is clearly archaic and overbroad," and that this
Court has not hesitated to invalidate gender classifications
based on "archaic and overbroad generalizations." Jur. State.

31A.
The court's discussion with respect to the appropriate
remedy is summarized in the memo in No. 78-689, attached.
CONTENTIONS:

The SG concedes that § 407 establishes a

gender-based classification, but contends that this classification is constitutional when analyzed under the intermediate

l

standard of review set forth in Craig v. Boren, supra, or any
other standard shor of strict scrutiny. Appellees, in opposition, assert

-6-

that three district courts have considered the constitutionality
~.

of§ 407, the court below and the courts in Califano v.
Stevens, No. 78-449, and in Califano v. Browne, No. 78-603;
that all of these courts had little difficulty concluding
that the statute was infirm; and that the decision below
should be affirmed.
The SG advances four reasons why the Court should afford
this case plenary review. first he argues that § 407 differs
from other gender-based statutes considered by the Court in
that although the Act imports a distinction based on gender,
it does not have gender-biased consequences. The Act does not
award benefits to a father where it denies benefits to a mother.
The award or denial of benefits in each case affects an entire
family, which will impact to an equal degree one man, one woman,
and children of either or both sexes.
Second, the SG submits that the limitation of aid to families
where the father is unemployed was not "the accidental byproduct
of a traditional way of thinking about females." Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Rather, it was the result of an "actual, considered legislative
choice." Ibid.

The 1967 Committee Reports give the following

explanation for the inclusion of the limitation:
This program was originally conceived as one to provide
aid for the children of unemployed fathers. However,
some States make families in which the father is working
but the mother is unemployed eligible. The bill would
not allow such situations. Under the bill, the program
could apply to the children of unemployed fathers.
H.R. Rep. No. 554, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1967).
Thus, the statute does not reflect "archaic and overbroad"
stereotypes about women. It was, instead, part of a conscious
decision on Congress' part to eliminate a specific flaw in

..
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the original AFDC program.
Third, the SG contends that the gender classification is
substantially related to the objective of reducing the
incentive of unemployed fathers to desert their families.
In enacting § 407, Congress heard testimony that 65% of all
families receiving AFDC payments were those where both parents
were alive but the father was absent from home. In contrast,
the families in which the father was present but the mother
was dead, incapacitated, or absent for any reason made up only
1.8% of all AFDC families. Congress therefore acted on solid
statistical evidence when it concluded that males are more
likely to desert their families than females. Although, as
the DC suggested, it is possible that there would also be an

t

incentive for the father to desert where the mother, who had
been the breadwinner, became unemployed, "this was not the
pressing problem that confronted Congress." Jur. State. 14.
Fourth, the SG argues that this case is distinguishable
from other decisions by this Court involving gender classifications in the Social Security area. Unlike Social Security
retirement or disability payments, which are based on contributions or taxes paid by a worker, AFDC payments are based on
a general, non-participatory welfare program. Thus, § 407
does not "denigrate ••• the efforts of women who do work and

•·

J

!

whose earnings contribute significantly to their families'
support." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, 420 U.S., at 645.
In a footnote, the SG informs the Court that the Secretary
has estimated that the total cost in fiscal year 1980 of extending
AFDC-UF benefits to families in which the mother but not .the
father is unemployed will be $510.7 million. Jur. State 7 n. 6.

•
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The appellees respond that the argument that this case is
somehow different because there is no "loser" on the basis
of sex is simply frivolous. Section 407 discriminates against
mothers in two-parent homes, such as the appellees in the
present case, by denying them and their families needed
welfare benefits that they would concededly have been provided
if they were male. Appellees also contend that the casual
substitution of the word "father" for "parent" in 1967, with
only a passing reference in the Committee Reports, indicates
that even in 1967 Congress was simply acting on the archaic
and overbroad assumption that women are dependent on their
husbands and that they are child-rearers and homemakers rather
than family breadwinners.
Appellees acknowledge that a central purpose of the AFDCUF program was to mitigate the problem of deserting fathers.
But they agree with the DC that the gender discrimination of
§ 407 is irrational in light of that purpose. Families such

as the Westcotts and the Westwoods, no less than families where
the father has been the breadwinner and is unemployed, face the
dilemma of remaining together and foregoing benefits or- separating
so that the remaining parent and children can qualify. In fact,
the record shows that after the Westcotts were denied AFDC-UF
benefits, their landlord, impatient for overdue rent, suggested
that William Westcott leave the horne so that Cindy and her
unborn child would be eligible for AFDC. Jur. State. 27A n. 16.
DISCUSSION: The SG suggests only one governmental objective
served by § 407's gender classification: the promotion of
family stability. For a two-parent family that meets the financial
requirements for AFDC eligibility, there are nine situations

-9-

where the family might have an incentive to separate in
order to obtain AFDC benefits under the traditional absentfrom-home criterion. (1) Where the father is unemployed and
the mother is not in the labor force (i.e., is unemployed
but does not meet the categorical requirements of the Act).
(2) Where the father is unemployed and the mother is unemployed.
(3) Where the father is unemployed and the mother is employed
in a modest paying job. (4) Where the father is not in the
labor force and the mother is not in the labor force. (5)
Where the father is not in the labor force and the mother is
unemployed. (6) Where the father is not in the labor force and
the mother is employed in a modest paying job. (7) Where the
father is employed in a modest paying job and the mother is
not in the labor force. (8) Where the father is employed in
a modest paying job and the mother is unemployed. And (9)Where
the father is employed in a modest paying job and the mother
is employed in a modest paying job. Appellees argue that the
statute is irrational because it covers only situations (1), (2),
and (3) and does not cover other situations where there are
two parent families with needy children. However, even if
the decision below were affirmed, the statute would then reach
only situations (1), (2), (3), (5) 1 and (8). This suggests
that there are "irrationalities" in the statute that go beyond
the imposition of a gender qualification. In particular, the
most needy families of all--those where both the father and the
mother have been out of work so long that neither qualifies

-

as "unemployed"--would not qualify for AFDC-UF even with the
reference to gender removed. On the other hand, a family where

-10-

the father is employed in a modest paying job and the mother
is unemployed would qualify.
Although the statute appears to be irrational both because
of the gender classification and otherwise, at least when
viewed in terms of abstract situations, the thrust of the
SG's argument is that Congress legislated on the basis of
what it believed to be the most common situations existing
in the real world--where the father is unemployed and the
mother is not earning enough to bring the family above the
AFDC financial requirements. There appears to be some support .,
for this ·interpretation in the legislative history. Moreover,
the SG has a plausible point that the gender classification
of § 407 presents issues that are somewhat different from
those considered in cases like Weinberger v. Weisenfeld that
involve contributory retirement and disability programs.
Finally, the separate appeal by Commissioner Sharp in No.
78-689 raises serious questions about the appropriate relief
in

th~s

case, and if those issues are to be addressed, the

merits of the equal protection claim should be considered
too.
I would note. There is a motion to affirm.
11/29/78

Merrill·

DC op. in Jur. State.
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
December 8, 1978 Conference
List 1, Sheet 1

~rom

No. 78-689-ADX

~n)

SHARP (Comm. Mass. Dept.
Public Welfare)

D. Mass.

v.

WESTCOTT (AFDC claimant)

Federal/Civil

Timely

SUMMARY: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252, which permits any
party who has received notice of appeal to take a subsequent
or cross appeal, the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health challenges the relief entered by the
DC in this case . Appellant contends that it should be allowed
to limit AFpC-UF payments

~o

families whose children are needy

because the "principal wage-earner" is unemployed. The facts and
general statutory background are set forth in the memo in No. 78-437.

-2-

DECISION BELOW: Section 407 of the Social Security Act
(

defin~s

the tenn "dependent child"to include "a needy child

who meets the [financial requirements of § 406] who has been
deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment (as detennined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) of his father •••• " Thus, the Act
gives the Secretary of HEW the authority to set standards
for the "unemployment" necessary to make a family eligible
for AFDC benefits. The regulations adopted by the Secretary
require each state to adopt a definition of an unemployed
father that "must include any father" who meets certain stated
requirements. 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(l).

Accordingly, Massachusetts

adopted regulations that limited eligibility for AFDC-UF pay-

~--------------~
----------------~-ments
to needy families
with unemployed fathers.
The DC concluded that § 407 violates the equal protection
guarantee of the 5th Amendment, and also concluded that
the Massachusetts regulations violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment. The DC considered that it had
two remedial choices: elimination of the AFDC-UF program altogether or extension of the AFDC-UF program to include all
children of needy families where either the father or the
mother was unemployed .within the meaning of the Act and implementing regulations. Applying the test articulated by Mr.
Justice Harlan in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 365 (1970),
focussing on "the intensity of commitment to the residual policy"
and "the degree of disruption of the statutory scheme that
would occur by extension as opposed to abrogation," the DC
opted for extension. Accordingly, it enjoined the Massachusetts
Commissioner from refusing to grant AFDC-UF benefits to families

-3with children deprived of parental support by reason of the
(

unemployment of the mother. It also enjoined the enforcement
of § 407 insofar as it acted to prevent the Secretary of HEW
from paying federal matching funds to Massachusetts for the
payment

of AFDC banefits to families who would be

~ligible

but

£or the fact that the mother rather than the father was unemployed.
Appellant then moved for clarification or modification of
the DC's opinion and order to permit the adoption of Massachusetts

~egulations

tha~

W?uld provide benefits only to families

with dependent children who were deprived of parental support
by reason of the unemployment of the parent who had been the
principal wage-earner. On August 9, 1978, the DC declined
~

to amend its order, concluding that any further reformulation
~

of the statutory scheme beyond deletion of the gender distinction
was a matter for Congress, not the courts, and that the State
was "'not free to narrow the federal standards that define the
categories of people eligible for aid' under the AFDC program,"

v

quoting quem v. Mandley, 46 U.S.L.W. 4594, 4598 (U.S. June
6, 1978).
CONTENTIONS: Appellant analyzes the AFDC-UF program in
terms of two models:

a _ sing~e

parent model, whereby benefits

would be paid to a needy family when a key individual--the breadwinner--became unemployed, and a two parent model, whereby
benefits would be paid to a needy family when either of two
paren~s

became unemployed, regardless of who was the bread-

winner. Appellant contends that the critical inquiry is what
form of sex-neutral AFDC-UF program, if any, Congress would
have established if it had known of § 407's constitutional

-4-

defect at the time of its enactment. Appellant maintains
that the legislative history of · § 407, the structure of the
Act, and considerations of comparative costs, all indicate
that Congress would have selected the single parent genderneutral model, rather than the two parent model. The DC's
order, however, by simply extending eligibility to needy
families with unemployed mothers, as well as needy families
with unemployed fathers, has mandated the adoption of the two
parent model.
The legislative history of the original 1961 version
of the AFDC-UF program indicates that the AFDC program was
expanded "to include families in which the breadwinner is unemployed." S. Rep. No. 165, 87th Cong., 1st Sees. 1 (1961).
"Breadwinner," according to appellants, denotes a status which
only one member of a family can hold at a given time. The
1968 revision also supports the view that Congress intended to
adopt the single parent model. The reason given for restricting
elegibility to families with unemployed fathers

"Z~as

that

"some States make families in which the father is working but
the mother is unemployed eligible"--in other words, some
states were affording benefits to families where the breadwinner
had steady employment.
The single parent model is also supported by consideration
of the structure of the Act. The Act imposes both categorical
and financial requirements for eligibility. The principal
categorical requirement is that the father must be employed for
less than 100 hours per month. The single parent model would
retain this requirement by conditioning eligibility upon the
principal wage-earner being employed less than 100 hours per

-5-

month. The two parent model would remove this requirement,
by permitting one parent, and then the other, to satisfy
the unemployment cirterion by working less than 100 hours,
while the other parent could work more than 100 hours.
As a result, the Act would be limited only by the financial
requirement.
Finally, appellant submits that the DC failed to consider
the cost differential between the single parent and the two
parent model of the AFDC-UF program as an index of Congressional
intent. Appellant estimates that the dual parent model would
cost Massachusetts $2,580,000 more than the single parent
model in the first year alone.
Appellees respond that there is no support for the "principal
wage-earner" test in the plain language of § 407, and that
the frequent references to ''breadwinner" in the legislative
history and the apparent disapproval of the payment of benefits
to families who were not acutally deprived of a breadwinner's
support does not justify re-writing the statute. Furthermore, the argument that the DC's order would eliminate the
requirement of unemployment is simply wrong. The Act makes
clear that there must be a parent ·who can satisfy all the
requirements for being unemployed,· including the prior work
history test.
More generally, appellees submit that appellant is really
arguing about the proper policy to follow in affording
welfare benefits to families with needy dependent children,
and that these policy considerations should be left for
Congress. For example, they point out that adoption of the
principal wage-earner test would mean that families currently

-6receivi~g
(~

benefits based on the father's

un~p~oyment

would

be terminated unless the father could show that he was
also the principal wage-earner.
The SG has also filed a memorandum opposed plenary review
of appellant's claim. The SG notes that under § 407 ~. it is
the Secretary, not the states, who has the authority to set
standards for the unemployment necessary to make a family
eligible for AFDC benefits. Because the DC's order did not
purport to restrict the Secretary's authority to define
"unemployment" in any gender-neutral way, or to prevent any
state dissatisfied with the federal standards to withdraw
form the AFDC-UF program. the DC's order is correct. The SG
---------~-------asks that the Court defer consideration
of this appeal pending
-----------~

-

-----

-

its decision in Califano v. Westcott, No. 78-437. If the Court affirms
the judgment in Westcott, it should affirm the portion of the
order challenged here. If the Court reverses in Wescott, then
it will be unnecessary to consider the propriety of the relief
ordered.
DISCUSSION:

Appellant has raised serious questions about the

proper form of relief which warrant plenary consideration if
the equal protection question is given plenary consideration.
The argument from the literal language of the statute cannot
be controlling. There is no more support in the statute
for requiring the payment of benefits to families with an
unemployed "parent" than there is for requiring the payment of
benefits to families with an unemployed "principal wage-earner."
There are at least ~ende:-n~utral ways of refo~ulating
the
Act, and congressional intent should be the central factor
,-.---~n _
determining which interpretation is correct. Appellant has

-7-

-

made a strong if not compelling case for the "two parent model.,. .
Full consideration of his contentions should not be too
burdensome if the Court must, in any event, review the
structure and function of § 407 in order to dispose of the
Secretary's appeal.
I would note and set for argument with Califano v. Westcott,
No. 78-437.
11/29/78

i

There is a motion to affirm and a memo from the SG.
Merrill

DC op. in No. 78-437;
order in Jur. State.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re:

No. 78-437, Califano v. Westcott
No. 78-689, nharp · v~ · westcott
The first of these cases, No. 78-437, presents the

questio~het~a

gender-based discrimination in Section 407

of the Social Security Act violates the Equal Protection
Clause.

Th~cond

case, No. 78-689, raises issues concerning

the remedy that should be ordered by the District Court if
Section 407 is unconstitutional.
I

Section 407 provides that if a family meets the need
criteria of the AFDC program, and if the father is unemployed,
the family qualifies for AFDC assistance.

By implication,

families in which the mother is unemployed are ineligible.

The

DC held that this statute violates the riqhts of the appellees
under the Equal Protection Clause.
In the fourth draft of your opinion in Caban · v.

I

2.

Mohammed, No. 77-6431, you state the standard for assessing the
constitutionality of gender-based statutory distinctions.
"Gender-based distinctions 'must serve governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives' in order to
withstand judicial scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause." Printed Draft, at 7, quoting
Craiq v; -Boren, 404 u.s. 190, 197 (1977).
Three pages later in the Caban draft, you cite with approval
the reiteration in

Re~d

v; · Reed of the standard stated in

Roys~er · Goanq · co~ · v~ · virginia, ,

253

u.s.

412 (1920):

such a

statutory "classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest on some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.'"
The present case illustrates some of the difficulties
with applying the foregoing standard.

While it is obvious that

some governmental objectives are themselves proscribed by the
Equal Protection Clause,

u.s.

374, 398 (1978)

see,~'

Zablocki - v; · Redhail, 434

(Powell, J., concurring)

(miscegenation

statute based on a classification "directly subversive of the
principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth
Amendment"), this leaves a wide universe of legitimate
governmental objectives.

To

I

.ln.,~.

It will be a rare statute indeed that

cannot be said to serve one or more of these objectives, and
yet, depending upon which of these objective one focuses upon,
the statute may achieve the purpose with more or less
completeness and more or fewer objectionable side effects.

In

3.

~

part this problem of multiple objectives can be dealt with by

~

restricting judicial attention to the objectives actually
entertained by the legislature when it enacted the statute.

~,

Trimble v. Gordon, 430

u.s.

762, 774-776 (1977).

~

..4o ~1-~

~~ r---"'
If the legislative history of the statute indicates, ~

however, that the legislature had multiple objectives that it

~

/7-

attention to actual legislative purpose will not resolve the
The parties to the present case, for example,

...____

suggest two different purposes that Congress had in
contemplation when it enacted Section 407.

Assuming that both

purposes were important reasons for the passage of Section 407,
you must decide how to accommodate such a situation to the
analysis outlined above.

(I will leave asioe for the moment

the difficult factual questions about legislative purpose that
necessarily are raised in applying the equal protection
standard set out above, and will assume that the purposes
suggested by the parties are adequately evident from the
legislative history of §407.)
The SG suggests that Section 407 was enacted to remove
the incentives for paternal desertion created by the original
------------~----~--AFDC program. Under that program, only needy children in
single-parent homes were eligible for aid.

This restriction of

aid to single-parent families encouraged desertion by one
parent: the SG says that experience showed that fathers often

•

•

-,-~11.-t!A-

sought to serve by enactment of the statute, restriction of

question.

I._

4.

deserted while mothers rarely did so.

He also indicates that

this experience was before Congress in the form of studies and
surveys at the time that Section 407 was enacted, and that
members of Congress referred to Section 407's purpose of
removing the incentive for family dissolution.
~ees, on the other hand,

primary purpose of Section 407 was

insist that the

~extend

~

the benefits of

the AFDC program to the children of unemployed parents.

~

They,

too, cite statements by various members of Congress that seem
to take this view of the purpose of the statute; in addition,
they rely on the temporary (1961 -

1967) precursor of Section

407, which extended benefits to children of an unemployed
"parent" rather than just an unemployed "father."
If the governmental objective is avoidance of family
dissolution, and if experience shows that the only substantial
threat is from paternal desertion, then Section 407 appears
somewhat carefully chosen to accomplish that purpose.

If,

however, the governmental objective is aid to needy children of
unemployed parents, then the gender-classification in Section
407 is much less adequate to the legislative purpose, and in
fact frustrates that objective in those cases in which the
mother rather than the father is unemployed.
Of course, the judgment that the statute serves one of
multiple purposes less well than another does not necessarily
mean that the statute is unconstitutional.

A problem arises

5.

only if the relationship between the statute and at least one
of the objectives is too tenuous to satisfy the Equal
Protection Clause.

Even then, one must decide whether a more

substantial relationship to another legitimate objective will
save the statute.
I think that this case can be decided, however,
without confronting that question.
Even assuming that one of
'-------------~----the objectives was the prevention of dissolution of families,
and that almost always it is the father rather than the mother
that deserts the family, it is not at all clear that
conditioning relief on the unemployment of the father will
accomplish the objective.

The SG does not cite any evidence

before Congress, or any statements by members during the
consideration of §407, that indicated any empirical basis for
the assumption that fathers usually or always desert because
they, rather than the mother, have become unemployed.

In the

absence of such information, Section 407, even as a response to
the problem of paternal desertion, appears to be a legislative
incorporation of outmoded stereotypes of men as family
~

~~-----------------------------------------

breadwinners rather than a careful response to the problem at
~

hand.

Accordingly, it would be difficult to conclude that the

use of the gender-based classification has a fair and
substantial relation to the objective of minimizing family
dissolution, much less to the objective of providing aid to
children of unemployed parents.

6.

If the statute is not substantially related to the
accomplishment of either of the objectives which it is said to
serve, then the sorting out of the factual questions regarding
legislative purpose need not be undertaken.

As you have seen

from the briefs in this case, there is at least some support in
the legislative history for supposing each of the two suggested
o~ s

to have been important to at least some members of

Congress.
..

I think it will be best if I wait for a specific

~

instruction from you on this poin,t before I take the time

to ~

read through the reports and debates on the statute.
II

(

7'?- "~"j)

Upon finding the gender-based classificat1on in

-

Section 407 unconstitutional, the DC ordered as a remedy
benefits under that section be paid to any otherwise qualified
family in which the mother or the father is unemployed.
78-689,

th~

In No.

appellant, the Commissioner of the Massachusetts

----------

Department of Public Welfare, contends that a much narrower
--------------~remedy should be ordered. He argues that the DC should have
mandated extension of Section 407 benefits be paid to

1

otherwis;~

eligible families in which the principal breadwinner is
unemployed.
Upon finding a portion of a statute unconstitutional,
a DC under some circumstances may enjoin any enforcement of the
statute.

This in effect wipes the law off the books and leaves

the legislature free to start over.

~·

7.

Under other conditions, however, the adoption of such
a remedy may be unjustified.

Here, for example, we are dealing

with a social security program the benefits of which are
extremely important to at least some recipients.
Section 1103 of the Social Security Act, 42
-z::_
contains the following provision:

Moreover,

u.s.c.

§1303,

"If any provision of this Act, or the application
thereof to any person or ~ircumstance, is held
invalid, the remainder of the Act and the
application ,of such provision to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected thereby."
Viewed in conjunction with the importance of Section 407 to the
recipients of aid under the AFDC-UF program, I think that
ad~tion

Section 1103 supports the

of a remedy that Qreserves

the statutory program while substituting the appropriate genderneutral classification.

None of the parties to this appeal

take issue with this conclusion.
What the parties do disagree about, as stated above,
is the definition of the appropriate gender-neutral
classification.

The appellant argues that Section 407 benefits

should be available to an otherwise eligible family with an
unemployed principal breadwinner.

The appellees, on the other

hand, argue that benefits should be available to needy families
with an unemployed parent.
The appellant's position on this point rests on

---------------------------First, it may

several simple but persuasive arguments.

be true

that the constitutional flaw in Section 407 is that Congress

8.

made an unfounded assumption that it was always the father's
unemployment that creates family need and incentives for family
dissolution.

But when Congress, working on the basis of that

assumption, provided for aid to needy families with unemployed
fathers, it thought that it was providing for benefits upon the
unemployment of the principal breadwinner.

Therefore, the

appropriate remedy is to substitute "principal breadwinner (or
wage-earner)" for "father" in the statute.
Second, when Congress enacted the temporary precursor
of Section 407, it provided for aid to needy families with an
unemployed "parent."

In the committee reports on Section 40 7,

one unintended consequence of the use of the term "parent" in
the temporary statutes was noted.
"This program was originally conceived as one to
provide aid for the children of unemployed fathers.
However, some States make families in which the
father is working but the mother is unemployed
eligible. The bill would not allow such
situations. Under the bill, the program could
apply only to the children of unemployed fathers."
Since Congress was proceeding on the assumption that fathers
are the principal breadwinners, its action in adopting Section
407 thus was tantamount to deciding that only the unemployment
tc

of the pricipal breadwinner should establish eligibility under

-~------~~----,---------------

-------

Section 40 7.

In adopting a remedy for the unconstitutional

legislative assumption, the courts should honor the underlying
congressional intention.
Third, the difference in the estimated costs of the

9.

principal-breadwinner remedy and the DC's remedy is
significant.

The appellant estimates the cost of the former at

an increase of $3.3 million over the current budget of $30
million for the Massachusetts AFDC-UF program.

In contrast, he

estimates that the DC's remedy will cost $23 million.

He

U/v-W

argues that other things being roughly equal, the courts should
be reluctant to choose the remedy requiring the greater
additional expenditure.
The individual appellees, on the other hand, urge that
the principal-breadwinner remedy suggested by the appellant
requires a much more thoroughgoing rewriting of Section 407
than does the DC's remedy.

Under the appellant's principal-

breadwinner remedy, they point out, some families that are
eligible under Section 407 as enacted by Congress will lose
their eligibility if the unemployed father is not determined to
be the principal breadwinner.

Judicial extension of the

statute to include persons not provided for by the original
statute is one thing, the appellees argue, but judicial
revision that excludes those eligible under the original
statute is quite another.

The courts will observe the proper

limits on their role more closely if they refrain from such
revision; in this case, that means simply ordering Section 407
benefits for the needy families of unemployed parents.
The problem with this argument is the change in 1967
from "any parent" to "father" in Section 407.

This change, as

_I

1 0.

explained in the report quoted above, makes it clear to me that

-

Congress did not intend the unemployment of any parent to
suffice for eligibility.

Rather, only the unemployment of the

~-----------------------If the assumption on which the selection of

father counts.

"father" was based is constitutionally flawed, the remedial
substitution still should be consistent with the congressional
rejection of the "any parent" standard.

Since the flawed

assumption was that only fathers are the principal or important
breadwinners in families, then, the appropriate substitution
for "father" is "principal breadwinner."
The United States is also an appellee in No. 78-689.
The SG's arguments in support of his contention that the DC has
no authority to adopt the principal breadwinner remedy
unpersuasive.

---------

are

~-------------------------------------

The SG argues first that because Section 407 qives the

Secretary of HEW authority to make regulations concerning the
exact definition of unemployment for AFDC-UF eligibility, the
Secretary's present regulations limit the remedial powers of
the courts.

In particular, he argues that
"the regulations now in force require that each
participating state adopt a definition of
unemployed father that 'must include any father'
who meets stated requirements. 45 C.F.R. 233.100.
That regulation, with a sex-neutral construction,
requires that a state plan include any parent who
meets federal requirements of unemployment. No
federal rule requires an 'unemployed' father (or
parent) to show that he has been the principal wageearner in the family."
Br. of SG, at 7.

The SG's second argument is really just a variation of the

11.

first.

He contends that in the form of the Secretary's

rulemaking authority under Section 407, Congress has already
"prescribed a specific device for filing statutory gaps.

That

device is the issuance of regulations by the Secretary.

The

Secretary, not the Court, must decide whether and how
'unemployment' should be redefined in light of any
constitutional flaw in the statute."

Id., at 8.

There are a number of problems with the SG's argument.
It contains, for example, at least one glaring non sequitur,
quoted above, in the argument that a sex-neutral construction
of the "any father" regulation must consist of substituting
"parent" for "father."

-

While qender-neutrality requires at

-

least the substitution of "parent" for "father," this leaves
open the principal question in this remedy phase of the case
should the category "parent" be qualified to include only the
"principal wage-earner or breadwinner" parent.
The critical flaw in the SG's argument, however, rests

~~~-----------------

in his mistaken overestimation of the importance of the
Secretary's rulemaking authority under Section 407.

The

Secretary's present regulations have been adopted pursuant to a
statute now held to be unconstitutional in certain aspects.
Assuming that the courts will adopt a remedy that reconstructs
the statute to remove the unconstitutionality while remaining
as faithful as possible to congressional intent, any
regulations inconsistent with that reconstructed statute will

12.

be invalid.

It puts the cart before the horse to say that

those existing regulations constrain the courts in devising the
necessary remedial reconstruction of the statute.
Of course, after the courts have settled the
classification to be substituted for "father" in Section 407,
the Secretary will have to make corresponding changes in his
regulations.

But there is no reason I can think of why the

courts should leave to the Secretary the final determination of
the proper remedy for Section 407's gender-biased
classification.
task.

This seems to me to be an essentially judicial

Once this Court and the DC have settled on the adoption

of either the "any parent" or the "principal wage-earner"
classification as a remedial substitute for the "any father"
category of Section 407, that new classification can be
substituted in the Secretary's existing regulations as well
until the Secretary can take the necessary administrative steps
to revise the language of his regulations.

LFP/lab

4/16/79

--

To:

Memo to File

From:

L.F.P., Jr.

Date:

April 16, 1979

No. 78-437 Califano v. Westcott
No. 78-689 Sharp v. Westcott

This is a pre-argument memo to summarize my
tentative thinking (see Bruce's memo of 3/27/79 that is
persuasive):
Califano v. Westcott
Section 407 of the Social Security Act provides
that if a family meets the need criteria of the AFDC
Program, and if the father is unemployed, the family
qualifies for assistance.
it does not qualify.

But if the mother is unemployed,

The DC invalidated this as gender

based discrimination.
In Caban, I stated that the standard requires that
such a distinction must serve governmental objectives and
"must be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives".
The SG argues that the principal objective in
focusing on the father was to remove the incentive for the
father to desert the home when he became unemployed.

But

certainly another primary purpose of Section 407 was to
provide AFDC benefits to the children of unemployed parents.

2.
The later objective is not served by Section 407.
But the difficulty with the gender based
distinction is that it does not bear a substantial relation
to the asserted purpose of keeping the unemployed father "in
the house".

It certainly bears no relation to the purpose

of providing aid to the children of unemployed parents.
Even if, as a generality, fathers are more likely
to be unemployed than mothers since more of them work, this
is by no means invariably true - particularly now when the
work force is composed to a major extent of women.
In sum, I find it difficult to defend the validity
of the classification when it serves one of the purposes
only marginally, and the other purpose not at all.

I am

inclined to affirm 78-437.

Sharp v. Westcott
This is a related case that we must decide only if
we agree that Section 407 is invalid.

The DC ordered as a

remedy that benefits under that Section be paid to any
otherwise qualified family in which the mother or the father
is unemployed.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the appellant
in this case, contends that a narrower remedy should be
ordered:

namely, that eligibility under Section 407 should

arise only when the principal breadwinner is unemployed.

3.
In short, rather than authorize benefits when
either the mother or father is unem?loyed (as the DC
ordered), Massachusetts would require benefits only where
the "principal breadwinner" is unemployed.

It is argued

that the DC's remedy will cost the state of Massachusetts
$23,000,000, as contrasted with about $3,000,003 under its
proposed resolution.
I am inclined to agree with Massachusetts.

It is

clear that one of the congressional purposes was to provide
benefits when the primary family provider was unemployed.
The vice in the statute is that it ignores the fact that the
mother could occupy this role.

If the remedy makes benefits

turn on whether or not the "principal breadwinner" is
unemployed, this basic purpose of Congress will be met.
I therefore am inclined to reverse the DC
in 78-689.

78-437 CALIFANO v. WESTCOTT
78-689 SHARP v. WESTCOTT

Argued 4/16/79
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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re:

No. 78-437, Califano v. Westcott
I have the following brief comments following

oral argument in this case.
1.

Merits -- I do not think that

the SG

raised any arguments to strengthen his defense of the
constitu~ tionality

of the statute.

That defense rests

fundamentally on the suggestion that the statute is
addressed to the specific poblem of fathers deserting
their families, in order to meet the single-parent
criterion for eligibility.

The flaw in this argument

is the sex-biased assumption that paternal desertion
is always (or usually) caused by paternal rather than
maternal unemployment.

As I pointed out in my Bench

Memorandum, there does not appear to be any evidence
in the legislative record to support the empirical
assumption that paternal desertion results from
paternal unemployment.

Where there is no evidence

2.

adduced to support such a gender-biased classification
as the one contained in the present statute, and where
the present involvement of women in the labor force
makes it likely that pressures for paternal desertion
are often generated by maternal unemployment (as in the
present case), I think that the Court should hold the
statute unconstitutionally discriminatory.
2.

Remedy

It seems clear from oral argument

that the question of remedy will divide the Court.

I

stand by my analysis of the problem in my Bench
Memorandum, with the following caveat.
Justice Rehnquist did suggest in one of his
questions at oral argument a possible way of
a compromise position.

~ea~hing

As I understood him, he

suggested that the DC only certified a class in which
the families had an----------------------~-------------unemployed motherJ and a father who
was not a part of the work force.

If that is so, then

relief ordered should not have gone beyond the limits
of this class.

Accordingly, the relief would be

consistent with the principal breadwinner theory

---

for reconstruction of the statute, since only families

-----------------

3.

in which the mother is the principal breadwinner
would be granted relief.

Two further questions

whether the unemployment of a mother who is not the
principal breadwinner, or that of a father who is not
the principal breadwinner, should qualify the family
for benefits -- would be left for later resolution.
There is some basis for Justice Rehnquist's
suggestion about the class actually certified.

The

named plaintiffs in the DC did have the characteristics
mentioned by Justice Rehnquist (unemployed mother,
non-working father).

And the motion for class

certification which was granted by the DC described
the class as "those

families with two parents

in the home ... who would otherwise be eligible for
AFDC ... but for the sex discrimination in the federal
statute ... which provide[s] for the granting of federally
funded AFDC ... to families deprived of support because
of the unemployment of their father, but not to families
deprived of support because of the mother's unemployment."
Since a family in which the mother is not the principal
breadwinner is not "deprived of support" by her
unemployment, those families, at least arguably, were not

4.

part of the class certified.

I hope that the

Conference will discuss this possible approach to
the remedy issue.

BB

4/18/79

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re:

No. 78-437, Califano v. Westcott
The plaintiffs in this case did not seek

retroactive benefits, so their only claim was for
declaratory and injunctive relief.
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CHAMBERS OF

HIEF JUSTICE

May 2, 1979

-- '

PERSONAL

1
~e:

78-689 - Alexander Sharp, II, etc. v.
Cindy Westcott, et al.

r Lewis:
Will you take on a dissent in this
?
'

'

v
\)

Regards,

~ W•J

Justice Powell

May 3, 1979

78-689 Sharp v. Westcott

Dear Chief:
I will be qlad to try a dissent.
At thP Conference I aqrepd ~ith Potter that the DC
should not havP rewritten the statute.
It should have oiven
a declRratory iudqment an~ issued an injunction and left the
rewritino to Conqress.
The District Court, hAvina undertaken to devise an
affirmative reme~v, should have focuse~ on "t~e prin~ical
waqe earner".
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

Mr . Justice Stewart
Mr . Justice Rehnquist

.§upuntt <!;ourl of tlrt ~nitt~ .§¥rs-

'Jllas-.frhtgton, !D. <!J. 2D?J!-,3
CHAMBERS OF

JUST ICE J OH N P A UL STEVENS

J un e 4, 1 97 9

Re:

78-437; 689 - Califano v. Westcott

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

rMr . Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

.Su:prtntt ~omt of t£rt 'Jiinittb ;§t2ttes
~a,glfittghm. ~. ~· 20.;tJ!~

June 4, 1979

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE

w.. . .J .

BRENNAN, .JR.

RE:

Nos. 78-437 & 689 Califano v. Westcott &
Pratt v. Westcott

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
cc: The Conference

·-

.;§u:prtm.t

<!Jourt of tfrt ~t~ ~tatts
<!J. 2C~J!.~

~~Ul~ghm. ~.

CHAMBERS OF

,,,..-T•r>

June 4, 1979

"'YR0N R WHITF

Re: Nos. 78-437 & 78-689 - Califano & Pratt v.
Westcott

Dear Harry,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

(

A: _/
-

•

I

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
cmc

•

~ltJlrtutt

<!fo-u:rt o-f tlrt ~tittb .®tatts
'UJaslri:ngLtn, :!9. <!f. 20,?J!..;t

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 4, 1979

Re:

Nos. 78-437 & 689 - Califano v. Westcott &
Pratt v. Westcott

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T,M.

Mr. Justice Blackrnun
cc:

The Conference

PBS-6/6/79

DRAFT OPINION
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Paul

RE: Califano v. Westcott, No. 78-437;
78-689
DATE:

Califano v. Pratt, No.

June 6, 1979

Mr. Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting
in part.
I agree with the Court that

§

407 violates the equal

protection component of the Fifth Amendment.

In my view,

however, the court below exceeded the proper limits of its

o..-LJ-.
to ~families

powers when it ordered the extension of benefits
which a mother has become unemployed.

This extension reinstates

a system of distributing benefits that Congress
when it amended

~

o.bviey.a~ intent

§

407 in 1968.

of Congress, the

further payment of benefits

in

~y

rejected

Rather than frustrate the

cour~ have

tt--1--1-,/.

-~~,,..

~1"\

unconsti

enjoined any

}l...t..... (~ 1.fi. :,...,..,; ftwtuf..
utional ,_ ba~

~
Because .the Court today approves · t..R-i-5 order, I dissent.

to ~{

2.

"Where a statute is defective because of
underinclusion there exists two remedial
alternatives:

a court may either declare it a

nullity and order that its benefits not extend to
the class that the legislature intended to
benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the
statute to include those who are aggrieved by
exclusion."
361

(1970)

Welsh v. United States, 398

u.s.

333,

(concurring opinion).

4,,{.,-dt(

·~

In choosing between these alternatives, a court
I

attempt to accomodate as fully as possible the policies and
judgments expressed in the statutory scheme as a whole.
See id., at 365-366 and n. 18.

It may not use its remedial
~.(

•t _,

powers to thwart the intent of the legislature Ato achieve
concededly legitimate objects.
The Court correctly observes that "the gender
qualification [of § 407] was part of the general objectives
of the 1968 amendments to tighten standards for eligibility
~,

and reduce program costs."

~A

to " ~-.,'

L
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partigular
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Congress 1\w.as "oncer:oed ::t.h..a.t benefits weule be entel'\eed to
11

~~
families where only one parent was unemployed

~ile

~.,I

principal wage-earner continued to

'f'l-l:Od ~e-e-i-~

. "'
Je.

the

3.

~~w

It is indisputable that Congress waRE€d to prohibit payment
"(

of AFDC-UF benefits to families where the breadwinner
remained employed.

Yet the result of the Court's decision

affirming the District Court's relief is to compel exactly
the extension of benefits Congress wished to prevent.

-~

l/

The relief that perhaps would best approximate

what Congress appears to have intended would limit payment
of benefits to those families in which the principal wageearner, regardless of gender, has become unemployed.
this approach presents

~~·
sev~r~l

difficulties.

But

It involves

r~~ 1-f
#~ I~
p

')It

-a

H
'Jw
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h~ 4.tk((
I

more than an extension of benefits to a class not

11M_

!Pf
previously covered:

Some families currently eligible for

AFDC-UF funds would be excluded.

Moreover, only with great

difficulty could the criterion of the "principal wageearner" be implemented "within the administrative framework
of the statute,"

Welsh, supra, at 366.

The concept is not

ftnv
-A.~

..--....-~·~.

4.

--

{ cdnst1tut1o~al ~law in the program is corrected.

Unlike

) the relief approved by the Court today, it is not manifest
~

that enjoining of the program would thwart the intent of

1

Congress.

\ suffering
•

The extension of AFDC benefits to families
only from unemployment was a relatively recent

development in the history of the program, which Congress
made permanent only on the understanding that payments
1

would be limited to cases where the principal wage-earner
was out of work.

It is far from clear that Congress would

have approved this extension if it knew that benefits would
be paid whenever either parent became unemployed.

In

addition, the hardships caused by enjoining the program to
those families which Congress
..
m1t1gate

db~l'l'
y
~
eg1s at1ve

~~
e to
..
prov1s1on

assist can be

~retroact1ve
.

~A

benefits. !;_/
In sum, the relief approved by the Court today
violates established principles governing the fashioning

1

equitable relief and ensures frustration of legitimate
legislative goals expressed in § 407.

Accordingly, I

FN1.

1.

The Court suggests that payments to families

where a breadwinner remains employed is not inconsistent
with the Act, because in cases where a parent becomes
incapacitated, benefits are paid regardless of the other
parent's employment status or history.
see ante, at

n. 9.

42 U.S.C. § 606(a);

This overlooks the special

circumstances involved when a parent suffers from an
incapacity.

In the great majority of such cases, the

family must bear not only the costs of income lost through
the one parent's unemployment, but also substantial medical
expenses resulting from the disability.
2.

The fact that none of the parties here has

sought this step, a
~'

point _~

is irrelevant.

~)

which the Court,..t

~ace~

..g,J;,e.a..t

This issue should turn on the

intent of Congress, not the interests of the parties.

A

court no less is "infringing legislative prerogatives,"
~'

at 22, when it acts at the behest of the particular

litigants before it, than when it chooses a remedy on its
own initiative.

FIRST DRAFT
Califano v. Westcott, No. 78-437;

Prptt v. Westcott, No. 78-

689
Mr. Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting
in part.
I agree with the Court that § 407 violates the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment.

In my view,

however, the court below erred when it ordered the extension of
benefits to all families in which a mother has become
unemployed.

This extension reinstates a system of distributing

benefits that Congress rejected when it amended § 407 in 1968.
Rather than frustrate the clear intent of Congress, the court
simply should have enjoined any further payment of benefits
under the provision found to be unconstitutional.
As Mr. Justice Harlan observed,
"Where a statute is defective because of
underinclusion there exist two remedial
alternatives:
a court may either declare it a
nullity and order that its benefits not extend to
the class that the legislature intended to
benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the
statute to include those who are aggrieved by
exclusion." Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333,
361 (1970) (concurring op1n1on).

2.
In choosing between these alternatives, a court should
attempt to accommodate as fully as possible the policies
and judgments expressed in the statutory scheme as a whole.
See id;, at 365-366 and n. 18.

It should not use its

remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the
legislature.
· The Court correctly observes that "the gender
qualification [of § 407] was part of the general objectives
of the 1968 amendments to tighten standards for eligibility
and reduce program costs."

Ante, at 10.

It is clear that

Congress intended to proscribe the payment of benefits to
families where only one parent was unemployed and where the
principal wage-earner continued to work.
"From all that appears, Congress, with an image of
the 'traditional family' in mind, simply assumed
that the father would be the family breadwinner,
and that the mother's employment role, if any,
would be secondary."
I~id.
Yet the result of the Court's decision affirming the
District Court's relief is to compel exactly the extension
of benefits Congress wished to prevent.

l/

Rather than thus rewriting § 407, we should leave
this task to Congress.

Now that we have held that this

statute constitutes impermissible gender-based
discrimination, it is the duty and function of the
legislative branch to review its AFDC-UF program in light
of ' our decison and make such changes therein as it deems
appropriate.

Leaving the resolution to Congress is

especially desirable in cases such as this one, where the

3.
allocation and distribution of welfare funds are peculiarly
within the province of the legislative branch.

See

Califano v. Jobst, 434

u.s.

U.S. 464, 479 (1977);

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471

47 (1977);

Maher v. ____.._.
Roe, 432

(1970).
We cannot predict what Congress thinks will be in
the best interest of its total welfare program.

The

extension of AFDC benefits to families suffering only from
unemployment was a relatively recent development in the
history of the program, a development that Congress made
permanent only on the understanding that payments would be
limited to cases where the principal wage-earner was out of
work.

We cannot assume that Congress in 1968 would have

approved this extension if it had known that ultimately
payments would be made whenever either parent became
unemployed.

Nor can we assume that Congress now would

adopt such a system in light of the Court's ruling that §
407 is invalid.
The Court emphasizes the hardships that may be
caused by enjoining the program until Congress can act.
There is the possibility, not mentioned by the Court, that
other hardships might be occasioned in the allocating of
limited funds as a result of court-ordered extension of .
these particular benefits.

In any event, Congress has the

option to mitigate hardships by providing promptly for
retroactive payments.

An injunction prohibiting further

payments at least will conserve the funds appropriated

4.

until Congress determines which group, if any, it does want
to assist.

The relief ordered by the Court today, in

contrast, ensures the irretrievable payment of funds to a
class of recipients Congress did not wish to

benefit.~/

Because it is clear that Congress intended to
prevent

the result mandated today, and that the

reexamination of

§

407 required under our decision properly

should be made by Congress, I dissent.

FN1.

1.

The relief that perhaps would best approximate

what Congress appears to have intended would limit payment
of benefits to those families in which the principal wageearner, regardless of gender, has become unemployed.

But

this approach presents several difficulties, as the Court
demonstrates.

Ante,
--.....

at 14-16.

Under these circumstances,

the modification of the order sought by appellant in No.
78-689 properly was rejected.
The Court suggests that payments to families where
a breadwinner remains employed are not inconsistent with
the Act, because in cases where a parent becomes
incapacitated, benefits are paid regardless of the other
parent's employment status or history.
see ante, at 15 n. 9.

42

u.s.c.

§

606(a);

This overlooks the special

circumstances involved when a parent suffers from an
incapacity.

In such cases, the family usually must bear

not only the costs of income lost through the one parent's
unemployment, but also medical and otherexpenses resulting
from the disability that often are quite substantial.
2.

The fact that none of the parties here has

sought this step, a point which the Court emphasizes, is
irrelevant.

This issue should turn on the intent of

Congress, not the interests of the parties.

A court no

less is "infringing legislative prerogatives,"

~'

at 15,

when it acts at the behest of the particular litigants
before it, than when it chooses a remedy on its own
initiative.
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PowELL,hconcurring in part and dissenting in

MR. JusTICE
part.
I agree with the Court that § 407 violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. In my view, however, the court below erred when it ordered the extension of
benefits to all families in which a mother has become unemployed. This extension reinstates a system of distributing
benefits that Congress rejected when it amended § 407 in 1968.
Rather than frustrate the clear intent of Congress, the court
simply should have enjoined any further payment of benefits
under the provision found to be unconstitutional.
As Mr. Justice Harlan observed,
"Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion
there exist two remedial alternatives : a court may either
declare it a nullity and order that its benefits not extend
to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it
may extend the coverage of the statute to include those
who are aggrieved by exclusion." Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (concurring opinion) .
In choosing between these alternatives, a court should attempt

't8-43'i' & 78-('189-CONCUR & DISSENT
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to accommoda.te as fully as possible the policies and judgments
expressed in the statutory scheme as a whole. See id., at
365-366, and n. 18. It should not use its remedial powers to
circumvent the intent of the legislature.
The Court correctly observes that "the gender qualification
[of § 407] was part of the general objectives of the 1968
amendments to tighten standards for eligibility and reduce
program costs." Ante, at 10. It is clear that Congress intended to proscribe the payment of benefits to families where
only one parent was unemployed and where the principal
wage earner continue to work.
"From all that appears, Congress, with an image of the
'traditional family' in mind, simply assumed tha.t the
father would be the family breadwinner, and that the
mother's employment role, if any, would be secondary."
Ibid.
Yet the result of the Court's decision affirming the District
Court's relief is to compel exactly the extension of benefits
Congress wished to prevent. 1
Rather than thus rewriting § 407, we should leave this task
to Congress. Now that we have held tha.t this statute conThe relief that perhaps would best approximate what Congress appears
to have intended would limit payment of benefits to those families in which
the principal wage earner, regardless of gender, has become unemployed.
But this approach presents several difficulties, as the Court demonstrates .
Ante, at 14-16. Under these circumstances, the mod:fication of the order
sought by appellant in No. 78-689 properly was rejected.
The Court suggests that payments to families where a breadwinner remains employed are not inconsistent with the Act, because in cases where
a parent become~:> incapacitated, benefits are paid regardless of the other
parent's employment l'!tatus or history. 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a); see ante,
at 15 n. 9. This overlook~:> the special circumstances involved when a
parent ::mffer3 from an incapacity. In such cases, the family usually must
bear not only the costs of income lost through the one parent's unemployment, but abo medical and other expensest.:esulting from the disability
that often are quite substantial.
L.....
1
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stitutes impermissible gender-based discrimination, it is the
duty and function of the Legislative Branch to review its
AFDC-UF program in light of our decision and make such
changes therein as it deems appropriate. Leaving the resolution to Congress is especially desirable in cases such as this
one, where the allocation and distribution of welfare funds
are peculiarly within the province of the Legislative Branch.
See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432
U. S. 464, 479 (1977); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471
(1970).
We cannot predict what Congress thinks will be in the best
interest of its total welfare program. The extension of AFDC
benefits to families sufl"ering only from unemployment was a
relatively recent development in the history of the program,
a development that Congress made permanent only on . the
understanding that payments could be limited to cases where
the principal wage earner was out of work. We cannot assume that Congress in 1968 would have approved this extension if it had known that ultimately payments would be made
whenever parent became unemployed. Nor can we assume
that Congress now would adopt such a system in light of the
Court's ruling that § 407 is invalid.
The Court emphasizes the hardships that may be caused by
enjoining the program until Congress can act. There is the
possibility, not mentioned by the Court, that other hardships
might be occasioned in the allocating of limited funds as a
result of court-ordered extension of these particular benefits.
In any event, Congress has the option to mitigate hardships
by providing promptly for retroactive payments. An injunction prohibiting further payments at least will conserve the
funds appropriated until Congress determines which group, if
any, it does want to assist. The relief ordered by the Court
today, in contrast, ensures the irretrievable payment of funds
to a class of recipients Congress did not wish to benefit.2
%The fact that none of tlw

partie~

lwrc

ha.~

sought this step, a point
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Because it is clear that Congress intended ~prevent there..
suit mandated today, and that the re-exami~on of § 407 re..
quired under our decision properly should be tnade byCongress, I dis~ent,

which the Court emphaRizrs, is irrelevant. This bHue should turn on
the intent of Congress, not thr interests of thr parties. A rourt no less
is "infringing legislative prerogat1ves," ante, at 15, when it acts at the
behest of the particular litigantR before it , than when 1t chooses a remedy
on its own initiative.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whorri THE CHIEF JusTICE ~
. MR. JusTICE TEWAR] join, concurring in part and dissenting I
in part.
I agree with the Court that § 407 violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. In my view, however, the court below erred when it ordered the extension of
benefits to all families in which a mother has become unemployed. This extension reinstates a system of distributing
benefits that Congress rejected when it amended § 407 in 1968.
Rather than frustrate the clear intent of Congress, the court
simply should have enjoined any further payment of benefits
under the provision found to be unconstitutional.
As Mr. Justice Harlan observed,
" Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion
there exist two remedia.l alternatives: a court may either
declare it a nullity and order that its benefits not extend
to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it
may extend the coverage of the statute to include those
who are aggrieved by exclusion." Welsh v. United States.
398 U. S. 333, 361 (1970) (concurring opinion).
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In choosing between these alternatives, a court should attempt
to accommoda.te as fully as possible the policies and judgments
expressed in the statutory scheme as a whole. See id., at
365-366, and n. 18. It should not use its remedial powers to
circumvent the intent of the legislature.
The Court correctly observes that "the gender qualification
[of § 407] was part of the general objectives of the 1968
amendments to tighten standards for eligibility and reduce
program costs." Ante, at 10. It is clear that Congress intended to proscribe the payment of benefits to families where
only one parent was unemployed and where the principal
wage earner continue to work.
"From all that appears, Congress, with an image of the
'traditional family' in mind, simply assumed tha.t the
father would be the family breadwinner, and that the
mother's employment role, if any, would be secondary."

Ibid.
Yet the result of the Court's decision affirming the District
Court's relief is to compel exactly the extension of benefits
Congress wished to prevent. 1
Rather than thus rewriting § 407, we should leave this task
1 The relief that perhaps would best approximate what Congress appears
to have intended would limit payment of benefits to those families in which
the principal wage earner, regardless of gender, has become unemployed.
But this approach presents several difficulties, as the Court demonstrates.
Ante, at 14-16. Under the:se circumstances, the mod:fication of the order
sought by appellant in No. 78-689 properly was :rejected.
The Court suggests that payments to families where a breadwinner remains employed are not inconsistent with the Act, because in cases where
a parent becomes incapacitated, benefits are paid regardless of the other
parent's employment status or history. 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a); see ante,
at 15 n. 9. This overlook:; the special circumstances involved when a
parent suffer3 from an incapacity. In such cases , the family usually must
bear not only the costs of income lost through the one parent's unemployment, but also medical and other expense3 resul t~* from the disability
that often are quite sl.l:b&tan tial.
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.,
Congress. Now thap we h~tve held that this statute constitutes impermissibie ~enderlbl'tsed discrimination, it is the
duty and function of the Legislative Branch to review ·its
AFDC-UF program in :light of our decision and 1nake such
changes therein as it deems appropriate. Leaving the resolution to Congress is especially desirable in' cAses such as this
one, where the allocation and distribution ' of welfare ful.1ds
l:tre peculiarly within the province of the 'Legislative Branch.
See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432
U. S. 464, 479 (1977); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471
(1970).
We cannot predict what Congress thinks will be in the best
interest· of its total welfare program. ' The extension of AFDC
benefits to families suffering only from unemployment was a
relatively recet1t development in the history 'of the program,
a developmen~ ' tha~ Co11gress made perm~n~np 011ly on · ~h~
understanding that payments could be limified to Cllses where
phe principal wage earner was out of work: We C!Umqt assume that Congress in 1968 would have approved this extension if it had known that ultimately payments would be made
whenever. either parent became unemployed. Nor can we
assume that Congress now would adopt such a system in light
of the Court's ruling that § 407 is invalid,
The Court emphasizes the hardships that may be caused by
enjoining the program until Congress can act. There is the
possibility, not mentioned by the Court, that other hardships
might be occasioned in the allocating of limited funds as a
result of court-ordered extension of these particular benefits.
In any event, Congress has the option to mitigate hardships
by providing promptly for retroactive payments. An injunction prohibiting further payments at least will conserve the
funds appropriated until Congress determines which grpup, if
any, it does want to assist. The relief ordered by the Court
'

~o
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today, in contrast, ensures the irretrievable payment of fu.nds
to a class of recipients Congress did not wish to benefit, 2
Because it is clear that Congress intended to prevent theresult mandated today, and that the re-examination of § 407 re,. }
quired under our decision properly shqul~ be ~ade 'by
Cpngress, I dis§ent1

T~ fact tha.t n0ne of the parties here has sou~t this step, a point
which the Court emphasizes, is irrelevant. This k;sue should turn on
the intent of Congress, not the interests of the parties. A court no less
is "infringing legislative prerogatives," ante, at 15, when it acts at the
behest of the particular litigants before it, than when it choose:; a remedy
on its own initi.ative.
2
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